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Abstract9
Many manufacturers, including Lenovo, Sony, Procter & Gamble, and Buckle, have
adopted differentiated distribution channels to market vertically differentiated prod-
ucts. However, there is scant literature addressing the issue of quality differentiation
in the presence of differentiated distribution channel policies. To fill this void, we ex-
amine whether (how) differentiated channel policies affect manufacturers’ quality dif-
ferentiation and all parties’ performance. Specifically, we consider a manufacturer who
produces two vertically differentiated products (high- and low-tier ) together, but with
two marketing options: (1) distributing both products through one retailer (Model O,
One-channel policy), or (2) providing high-quality products through one channel but
low-tier products through another (Model T, Two-channel policy). Our results show
that the manufacturer is more likely to decrease the level of quality differentiation in
Model T than in Model O. Moreover, contrary to popular belief, we show that “quality
distortion” is not limited to low-tier products but can occur with high-tier products.
Among other results, we find that the one-channel policy benefits the retailer but hurts
both the manufacturer and the total supply chain. To test the robustness of the results,
we also comment on how the additional horizontal consumer heterogeneity affects our
results and the implications of the competition at the manufacturer level.
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1. Introduction12
In the past two decades, with improving living standards and accelerating globali-13
sation of economies, consumer demands have become more diversified and personalised14
(Ma et al. 2012). To cater to a broader and more heterogeneous mix of consumer groups,15
manufacturers increasingly design product lines by segmenting their markets in terms16
of quality attributes (Desai 2001). For example, Lenovo offers different sizes of memory17
for its laptops, SONY makes different screen sizes for its TVs, and Toyota provides cars18
ranging from the small Tercel to the full-size Avalon.19
Although quality differentiation is a fundamental goal in creating a competitive20
advantage for a firm (Meulenbroeks 1998), a range of operational management issues21
arise when delivering quality segmentation solutions (Desai et al. 2001). The dominant22
concern is the risk of a cannibalisation problem in designing product lines (Pelegrin et23
al. 2016). For example, in 2010, when Apple intended to extend its product line from24
Macintosh to the iPad, it was particularly worried about the potential for cannibalisation25
of Macintosh sales by the iPad. Similarly, the subsequent launch of the iPad Mini26
sparked a widespread discussion on how this new, smaller iPad may cannibalise sales27
for the company’s existing tablet computers (Barnato 2012). When confronting such28
“serious concerns”, the CEO of Apple, Tim Cook, was inclined to accept it: “I see29
cannibalisation as a huge opportunity for us, we know that iPad will cannibalise some30
Macs. That doesn’t worry us” (Seward 2013).31
Quality segmentation strategies apply not only in a manufacturer’s product lines’32
design, but also in its marketing channel decisions (Zhang and Cao 2014, Handley and33
Gray 2015). Manufacturers consider the many possible combinations of marketing chan-34
nel design elements and quality segmentation. For example, to mitigate the potential35
cannibalisation problems between high- and low-value segments, many manufacturers36
adopt a “two-channel policy”, selling their high-tier products in a high-end store and37
their low-tier products in a low-end store. For example, Procter & Gamble (P&G) pro-38
vides “Olay” for low-end users through supermarkets and “SK-II” for high-end users39
through specially designed cabinets in department stores and shopping malls. The40
underlying rationale behind the above channel decisions is as follows. A two-channel41
policy enables a firm to segment heterogeneous consumers better and mitigates the po-42
tential cannibalisation problems; therefore, a two-channel policy should be optimal for43
multiproduct manufacturers (Zhang and Cao 2014). Although simple and useful, this44
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perspective ignores a key point: such a two-channel policy results in more competi-45
tion between downstream stores, which might only care about their own interests and46
independently seek to maximise their own profit. Some manufacturers then adopt a47
“one-channel policy” that reduces competition by selling all products in one store or48
chain. For example, in the skin-care and cosmetics industry, Johnson & Johnson (J&J)49
launched its skincare lines “Clean & Clear”, “Neutrogena” and “Johnson’s baby care”50
under one channel (Palsule-Desai et al. 2015). Differentiated channel policies can also51
be observed in a variety of industries; for example, Buckle (apparel), Conn’s (electronics52
and appliances), and Tiffany & Co. (jewellery) adopt a one-channel policy. Conversely,53
Sterling Jewelers (jewellery), Matai Inc. and Gap Inc. (apparel) adopt a two-channel54
policy.55
The above discussion raises the fundamental question addressed in this paper —56
– whether (how) differentiated channel policies affect manufacturers’ quality differen-57
tiation and all parties’ performance. In practice, to deal with such a manufactur-58
ing/marketing problem, a multiproduct manufacturer needs to grow sales while simulta-59
neously developing operational models of quality segmentation. More specifically, from60
the manufacturing interface, the manufacturer can match a broader mix of consumer61
groups by adopting quality differentiation strategies. However, such quality differentia-62
tion strategies usually raise the concern that the lower-margin products may cannibalise63
the sales of higher-margin products (Parlakturk 2012, Yan et al. 2015). In contrast,64
from the marketing perspective, the manufacturer can limit cannibalization problem by65
providing high-tier products through one channel and low-tier ones through another;66
however, multi-product manufacturers have to carefully consider the problem of compe-67
tition between downstream stores, because consumers can self-select the products they68
want to purchase (Desai 2001).69
In this paper, we address the above mentioned question from a manufacturing & mar-70
keting perspective and derive theoretical implications for two possible configurations. A71
multiproduct manufacturer that produces two types of products (high- and low-tier) to-72
gether has two options for marketing: (1) marketing both products through one retailer73
(Model O, the one-channel policy), or (2) providing high-quality products through one74
retailer and low-tier products through another retailer (Model T, the two-channel pol-75
icy). Using both models, we explore the relationship between three interrelated decisions76
regarding the manufacturer’s product lines’ design and distribution channel decisions:77
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(1) How do the manufacturer’s quality decisions vary under differentiated channel poli-78
cies? (2) Which scenario is beneficial for the manufacturer, the retailer(s) and the supply79
chain: selling differentiated products under one channel or two? (3) What is the effect80
of channel structure on the equilibrium?81
There is a considerable body of literature addressing the quality segmentation con-82
fronting heterogeneous consumers who differ in their willingness to pay for quality (see,83
Qi et al. (2015) and references therein). However, these studies do not consider the84
horizontal interactions between downstream intermediaries in marketing on a manufac-85
turer’s quality differentiation decisions. We fill this gap by highlighting the fact that,86
when implementing workable quality segmentation, a multiproduct manufacturer needs87
to trade off marketing channel design elements and quality segmentation emphasis. Con-88
versely, despite numerous researchers studying channel policy from a marketing perspec-89
tive (see, Zhang and Cao (2014) and references therein), previous studies traditionally90
assume that quality is exogenous and little is known about how channel policy affects91
a manufacturer’s manufacturing management and quality segmentation. We therefore92
provide an alternative approach that is also somewhat complementary, to highlight how93
the manufacturer’s quality decisions vary under differentiated channel policies.94
Our results show that a manufacturer is more likely to reduce the level of quality dif-95
ferentiation under the two-channel policy than the one-channel policy. Furthermore, we96
find that “quality distortion” is not limited to low-tier products, as previously reported,97
but can occur with high-tier products. The direction of the high-quality distortions is98
always downward. In addition, our results reveal that the one-channel policy benefits99
the retailer but hurts both the manufacturer and the total supply chain. We then extend100
both models to a market where consumers are two-dimensionally heterogeneous and/or101
the manufacturers compete with each other, these two extensions further reveal that102
all results are robust regardless of whether there is a customer search problem and the103
competition at manufacturers level or not.104
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related105
literature and explains our contributions in more detail. Section 3 introduces notations106
and outlines our two models. Section 4 reports our main findings. Section 5 presents107
two possible model generalizations. Section 6 concludes the paper.108
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2. Relevant literature109
Most research addressing quality segmentation in manufacturing has taken one of110
two approaches. The first is an emphasis on quality differentiation under the assump-111
tion that product quality is exogenous. Mussa and Rosen (1978) first considered a112
monopolist selecting quality positions when serving a market with consumers that have113
heterogeneous valuations for quality. Recently, Zhao et al. (2009) examined the choice of114
a channel structure in which decisions regarding vertical integration or decentralisation115
influence firms’ quality and price strategies. More recent work by Lee et al. (2013) esti-116
mates a general model that summarises the linkages among the factors shaping optimal117
channel structure decisions in a multi-brand, multi-outlet market. Subsequently, Xiao118
et al. (2014) indicated that, if the reservation price in the indirect channel is sufficiently119
low, then adding the direct channel raises the unit wholesale price and retail price in the120
indirect channel. In contrast to these studies, in both of our models we consider that121
quality is an endogenous decision made by the manufacturer.122
There are also many studies, beginning with Spengler (1950), that assume that prod-123
uct quality is endogenous and that customers have heterogeneous preferences for quality.124
Rhee (1996) notes that manufacturers should offer a product of similar quality when125
consumer heterogeneity is not sufficient; otherwise, offering identical qualities is opti-126
mal. Ha et al. (2016) show that a manufacturer offering differentiated products through127
two channels prefers to sell its high-tier product through a direct channel. Several other128
papers have studied endogenous quality in supply chain coordination (e.g., Bacchiega129
and Bonroy (2015), Yang et al. (2015), brand value (e.g., Choi and Coughlan (2006) and130
Davcik and Sharma (2015)), and product line design (e.g., Desai (2001)). This paper131
follows this stream of research by treating product quality as a decision variable for the132
manufacturer, but differs in an important way: we examine the strategic consequences133
of cannibalisation and competition under manufacturing/marketing trade-offs. That is,134
we highlight whether (how) differentiated channel policies affect manufacturers’ qual-135
ity differentiation and all parties’ performance, which has been overlooked by previous136
researchers.137
Although most research on quality segmentation has not considered the role of mar-138
keting channel structures, there are a few notable exceptions. In particular, Villas-Boas139
(1998) establishes that channel decentralisation drives a manufacturer to downward140
quality distortion for low-value consumers. In contrast, Chung and Lee (2014) show141
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that channel decentralisation does not necessarily lead to quality distortion with low-142
end products, but that this can occur with high-end products. Shi et al. (2013) find143
that the effect of channel decentralisation on product quality depends on the type of144
consumer heterogeneity and its distribution in a market. However, as a set, these pa-145
pers do not consider the horizontal interactions among downstream intermediaries in146
marketing on a manufacturer’s quality differentiation decisions, which is a focus of our147
paper. These previous studies provided the inspiration for us to explore this theme.148
The final related stream of literature has studied channel policies in marketing. Jeu-149
land and Shugan (1983) consider the channel coordination problem with a manufacturer150
distributing its products through a one-channel policy. Cachon and Lariviere (2005)151
study revenue-sharing contracts with revenues determined by each retailer’s purchase152
quantity and price, and demonstrate that revenue sharing can coordinate a supply chain153
with a one-channel policy. Geylani et al. (2007) illustrate a strategic manufacturer’s154
response to a two-channel policy (i.e., a dominant and a weak retailer) for the sale of a155
single product. Liu et al. (2013) evaluate the implications of advertising strategies for156
overall supply chain efficiency and consumer welfare, in the context of a manufacturer157
selling to consumers through a one-channel policy. Zhang and Cao (2014) investigate158
the case in which a multi-product retail firm facing deterministic demand distributes two159
vertically differentiated products and chooses one or two stores (channels) at which to160
sell them. Glock and Kim (2015) study a single-vendor multi-retailer supply chain and161
consider the effect of decreasing the competition between marketing channels by forward162
integration. To our knowledge, previous studies of channel policy have not examined the163
manufacturing/marketing trade-offs. We therefore provide an alternative approach that164
is also somewhat complementary, to highlight how a manufacturer’s quality decisions165
vary under differentiated channel policies.166
3. Model description and equilibrium analysis167
3.1. Model setup168
We consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and one and/or two re-169
tailer(s). The manufacturer provides two different quality products: high- and low-tier.170
She1 then has two differentiated channel policies with which to market the products: (1)171
1Throughout this article, we use the feminine pronoun to refer to the manufacturer and the masculine
pronoun to refer to the retailer.
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distributing both high- and low-tier products through one channel, i.e., the one-channel172
policy (Model O); or (2) selling the high-tier products through one store and the low-tier173
products through another, i.e., the two-channel policy (Model T).174
We assume the timing in both models is as follows: first, the manufacturer decides on175
the optimal quality levels (uh, ul) and the wholesale prices (wh, wl) for both products.176
Observing the manufacturer’s optimal strategies on quality and wholesale prices, the177
retailer(s) then chooses the optimal units (qh, ql) to be sold to consumers. Our assump-178
tions regarding the manufacturer, retailer(s), consumer preferences, and decision-making179
framework are as follows.180
3.1.1. Manufacturer181
The manufacturer’s problem is to choose the optimal quality levels for both products182
and the wholesale prices to maximise her profit. As in Ha et al. (2016), we assume that183
the manufacturer’s unit cost for producing a product with quality u is ku2. Since184
uh > ul > 0, the unit cost for producing a high-tier product (uh) is higher than that for185




The retailer is a profit maximiser who is responsible for the optimal units for both188
products (qh, ql), where qh is the quantity of high-tier products, and ql is the quantity189
of low-tier products. Marketing high-tier products is usually accompanied by more190
promoters, luxurious decorations, and more exclusive shelves, while these costs are lower191
for a retailer who distributes low-tier products, we therefore distinguish the cost of selling192
high- and low-tier products with an assumption of ch = c > cl = 0.
2 Such a premium193
has been widely adopted in the literature in marketing to reflect the level of competition194
between both channels (e.g., Arya et al. 2007, Ha et al. 2016, Yan et al. 2018).195
3.1.3. Consumers196
Consistent with Li et al. (2014) and Qi et al. (2015), we consider a market, with size197
normalised to 1, that consists of consumers whose heterogeneous preferences for quality198
are uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Then, the consumer’s utility can be defined as199
U(u, p, θ) = θu − p. Without loss of generality, let uh > ul, we can derive the inverse200
2we thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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demand functions for high- and low-tier products from the consumer utility functions201
as follows:3202
ph = uh − uhqh − ulql
pl = ul(1− qh − ql)
(1)
3.2. Equilibrium analysis203
Based on the inverse demand functions in equation (1), we can now consider our two204
models—Model O and Model T—in which πba represents the profit for player a under205
b channel policy, where subscript a ∈ {m, r, s} denotes the manufacturer, the retailer,206
and the supply chain, respectively; and superscript b ∈ {O, T} denotes Model O and207
Model T, respectively.208
3.2.1. Quality differentiation under one-channel policy (Model O)209
In Model O, all products are sold through one store. The retailer chooses the optimal210
outputs of high- and low-tier products (qh, ql) to maximise his profit. That is, taking the211




πOr = (ph − wh − c)qh + (pl − wl)ql (2)
where the first term is the retailer’s revenue from selling high-tier products, the second214
term is the retailer’s income from marketing low-tier products, and the remaining two215
terms are the retailer’s cost of wholesaling high- and low-tier products.216
Anticipating the retailer’s response to the wholesale prices she sets, the manufacturer217
chooses the wholesale prices (wh, wl) and quality levels (uh, ul) to maximise her profit:218
max
wh,wl,uh,ul
πOm = (wh − ku2h)qh + (wl − ku2l )ql (3)
Backward induction is employed to determine the subgame perfect equilibrium in219
each model. Specifically, we first determine the retailer’s optimal quantities from (2)220
and then substitute them into (3), which provides the equilibrium wholesale prices and221
quality levels. The following proposition summarises both players’ optimal decisions in222
Model O.4223
3See Appendix for the detailed derivation. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to list
the detailed derivation.
4For clarity, all proofs are provided in the appendix.
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Proposition 1. In Model O, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale prices, quality levels,224




























































































Proposition 1 is partly consistent with previous studies (e.g., Chung and Lee (2014))5235
and provides a baseline for subsequent analysis to focus on the key drivers underlying236
the effects of different channel structures on product line design. In that regard, the first237
variation we consider is the case of the two different quality products being distributed238
through differentiated stores (i.e., Model T), ceteris paribus.239
3.2.2. Quality differentiation under two-channel policy (Model T)240
In Model T, the manufacturer can reach consumers by adopting a two-channel policy,
in which high-tier products are distributed through one channel and low-tier products
are sold by another. More specifically, Retailer One chooses his output of high-tier
products (qh) and Retailer Two chooses his output of low-tier products (ql).
max
qh
πTr1 = (ph − wh − c)qh
max
ql
πTr2 = (pl − wl)ql
(4)
Anticipating the retailer’s optimal strategies, the manufacturer chooses the optimal241
wholesale prices (wh, wl) and quality levels (uh, ul) to maximise her profit, that is:242
max
wh,wl,uh,ul
πTm = (wh − ku2h)qh + (wl − ku2l )ql (5)
5This determination differs from those of Chung and Lee (2004), which is a key difference that
we believe stems from our model’s focus on different channel policies and competition between retail-
ers rather than a channel composed of one manufacturer and one retailer, which is either vertically
integrated or decentralised.
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As before, we can obtain the following equilibrium quantities, wholesale prices, qual-243
ity level and profits using backward induction:244
Proposition 2. In Model T, the equilibrium quantities, wholesale prices, quality levels,245




































































































(15817100k3c3 − 185679k2c2 + 462024kc+ 136323)
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9 + 92kc+ 167904600k4c4








From Proposition 2, compared with proposition 1, we find that the quantities of257








h ). Possible explanations for this258
observation are as follows. Both our models face the classic double marginalisation prob-259
lem6 because they consist of an upstream agent (manufacturer) and downstream agents260
(retailers). However, in Model T, the manufacturer distributes products through two261
competitive retailers, a strategy that can mitigate the adverse effects of double marginal-262
isation. As a result, compared with Model O, the units of both products increase in263









4. Results and implications265
To ensure the comparison of the interior point solutions to both models, as in Gilbert266
and Cvsa (2003), Savaskan et al. (2004) and Yan et al. (2015), we derive the following267
assumption: in both models, the cost of selling a high-tier product is not sufficiently268
large; that is, 0 < c < min( 1
36k
, 1). As in the rest of the subsection, we consider only the269
intersection of the two models.270
6All channel members independently seek to maximize their own profit, resulting in higher retail
prices and lower sales quantities and profits than in a vertically integrated channel (Spengler 1950).
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4.1. Effect of differentiated channel policies on quality segmentation271
Based on Propositions 1 and 2, we derive some interesting insights into the two272
models. We now address the question posed at the beginning of this paper: How do the273
manufacturer’s quality decisions vary under differentiated channel policies? We answer274
this question as follows:275
Remark 1. Compared with Model O, the levels of quality differentiation in Model T276









A major concern of this paper is to examine the strategic consequences of canni-278
balisation and competition under the manufacturing/marketing trade-offs. Remark 1279
reveals that, when confronted by two competitive retailers, the optimal policy for the280
manufacturer is more likely to reduce the difference between both products than to281
increase it. This argument is contrary to the conventional wisdom that, under a com-282
petitive situation, a firm needs to “distort” product quality levels away from each other283
to mitigate the cannibalisation problem between product lines (e.g., Mussa and Rosen284
(1978), Desai (2001) and Ha et al. (2016)).285
This can be interpreted as follows. Note that the monopoly manufacturer can inter-286
act with two competitive retailers in Model T. Intuitively, as the competition between287
the retailers increases, the profitability of the supplier increases (Kopalle et al. 2009;288
Biswas et al. 2016). Taking this reasoning one step further, to introduce more intense289
downstream competition, as described in Remark 1, the manufacturer is more likely to290
increase the substitutability of products, which leads to a more intense cannibalisation291
problem. Conversely, in Model O, all products are distributed by a monopoly retailer;292
thus, if the manufacturer creates a more intense cannibalisation problem, both the293
monopoly retailer and the manufacturer will suffer from the increased substitutability294
of both products.295
The common conclusion of previous research in this area (e.g., Villas-Boas (1998),296
Desai et al. (2001) and Qi et al. (2016)) is that, in general, exaggerated product297
differentiation in a product line is created by downward quality distortion of the low-298
tier product, while the high-tier product is immune to quality distortion. However, it is299
not clear whether this conclusion will hold if the manufacturer confronts a retailer (or300
retailers) who has a potential flexibility to choose different channel polices. In particular,301
we formulate the following remark:302
11
Remark 2. Compared with Model O, the manufacturer always downwardly distorts the303
high-tier products in Model T; however, the quality distortion of low-tier products may304
be downward or upward.305
Remark 1 shows that, compared to that in Model O, the optimal policy of the306
manufacturer would reduce the difference between the two products in Model T. Remark307
2 further indicates that the competition between downstream agents may affect both308
the high-tier and low-tier products: On the one hand, in a high-valuation market, the309
optimal quality of high-tier products in Model T is always lower than that in Model O.310
On the other hand, in a high-valuation market, when c > 162
10000k
, the optimal quality311
of low-tier products in Model T is always lower than that in Model O; otherwise, the312
opposite is true. Taken together, these two remarks suggest that, when confronting the313
competition between downstream agents, the manufacturer is more likely to reduce the314
difference between the two products by unduly downwardly distorting the quality of the315
high-tier products; however, she may downwardly or upwardly distort the quality of the316
low-tier products.317
As mentioned earlier, selling products through a two-channel policy, in which two318
downstream agents independently seek to maximise their own profit, results in stronger319
competition than in Model O. If the high-tier products were not counterbalanced by320
setting a lower price through downwardly distorting quality, then the cannibalisation321
from low-tier products would unduly reduce the demand for the high-tier products and322
thereby reduce the profits. Thus, although the downward quality distortion for high-323
tier products reduces the marginal revenue from them, it increases profits by supporting324
their substantial demand through offering lower prices. Note that the manufacturer’s325
profits come from two sources: selling high- and low-tier products. When the selling326
cost disadvantage for high-tier products is sufficiently pronounced (i.e., c > 162
10000k
), the327
manufacturer’s profitability from high-tier products decreases. Thus, in order to earn328
more profits, the manufacturer has little concern about cannibalisation from the low-329
tier products and would increase the availability of low-tier products by downwardly330
distorting their quality. However, when the selling cost disadvantage for high-tier prod-331
ucts is not pronounced (i.e., c < 162
10000k
), the manufacturer is greatly concerned about332
cannibalisation from the low-tier products. To avoid reducing the marginal revenue from333
high-tier products, the manufacturer would upwardly distort low-tier products, resulting334
in a lower cannibalisation problem from those low-tier products.335
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Conventional wisdom also suggests that an exaggerated product differentiation ac-336
companies the downward quality distortion of a low-tier product, while the high-tier337
product is immune to quality distortion. In particular, Villas-Boas (1998) concluded338
that, in general, the downward quality distortion of a low-tier product becomes mag-339
nified, leading to quality degradation and increased differentiation in the product line.340
However, Remark 2 reveals that, when confronting competing downstream agents, a341
manufacturer is more likely to reduce the quality difference by unduly downwardly dis-342
torting the quality of the high-tier products. Although a similar modelling approach is343
adopted in Villas-Boas (1998), our model differs due to its focus on whether (how) dif-344
ferentiated channel policies affect manufacturers’ quality differentiation and all parties’345
performance. It is also inconsistent with the results of Chung and Lee (2014), who show346
that channel decentralisation does not necessarily lead to quality distortion of low-tier347
products, but that this can happen to high-tier products.348
4.2. Effect of differentiated channel policies on profitability349
We can now address the second question posed at the beginning of this paper: Which350
scenario is beneficial for the manufacturer, the retailer(s) and the supply chain: selling351
differentiated products under one channel or two? Based on Propositions 1 and 2, we352
are able to summarise several key differences between the two models:353

















Remark 3i) shows that the manufacturer always benefits from the two-channel policy359
because two factors provide her with greater profits in Model T. First, as the number360
of retailers increases (from one retailer in Model O to two retailers in Model T), the361
competition between downstream agents becomes fiercer; consequently, both retailers362
are more likely to offer a lower price but larger quantities than those in Model O.363
Thus, consistent with Remark 3i) shown, as the competition between downstream agents364
(retailers) increases, the profitability of the supplier (manufacturer) increases. Second,365
as described in Remark 1, under the two-channel policy in Model T, the manufacturer366
can derive more revenue from retailer competition by decreasing the level of quality367
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differentiation. As a result, the manufacturer can obtain even higher profits from the368
two-channel policy than from the one-channel policy.369
Not surprisingly, the profits of the retailer are always lower in Model T than in Model370
O. Interestingly, however, Remark 3ii) is inconsistent with the results of Zhang and Cao371
(2014); they treat quality as an exogenous variable, whereas we consider quality as an372
endogenous decision made by the manufacturer. Moreover, they only address different373
channel policies from the retailers’ perspective, and pay little attention to how different374
channel policies can affect the manufacturer’s quality differentiation decisions.375
To explain the variation in the supply chain profit, we first note that allowing retailers376
to compete with each other in Model T can mitigate the traditional double marginalisa-377
tion problem in the supply chain. Not surprisingly, Remark 3iii) reveals that, although378
the retailer suffers more in Model T, the profits of the total supply chain are always379
greater in Model T than in Model O. On the one hand, as described in Remark 3i),380
as the competition between downstream agents (retailers) increases, the profitability381
of the supplier (manufacturer) increases. On the other hand, the competition between382
retailers can enhance the supply chain profit even when it reduces both retailers’ profits383
(see Remark 3ii)), due to mitigation of the traditional double marginalisation problem384
in the supply chain when the two retailers compete.385
4.3. The role of competition between downstream agents386
We distinguish between the cost of selling high- and low-tier products with an as-387
sumption of ch = c > cl = 0. Such a premium has been widely adopted in the literature388
to reflect the level of the competition between two channels (Arya et al. 2007, Ha et al.389
2016, Yan et al. 2018). We can now highlight the role of competition between down-390
stream agents by considering the effect of differentiated selling costs on the equilibrium391
in both the models below.392
Remark 4. i) As the selling cost of high-tier products (c) increases, the levels of quality393














ii) The difference in the retailer’s profit between the two models is the highest for the396






∂c > 0, otherwise, the397
opposite is true;398
iii) As the cost of selling high-tier products (c) increases, the difference in the prof-399
















Remark 4i) suggests that the quality differentiation in both models decreases with402
the cost of selling high-tier products. Recall that an increase in the cost of selling403
high-tier products means that retailers have a greater disadvantage in marketing high-404
tier products, which can reduce the competition between high- and low-tier products.405
Note that increased competition among retailers contributes to the profitability of the406
manufacturer. Hence, in Model T, as the disadvantage from selling high-tier products407
increases, the manufacturer tries to increase the difference between the products. How-408
ever, in Model O, when confronting a monopolist retailer who distributes both products409
together, as the disadvantage of selling high-tier products increases, the manufacturer410
is more likely to reduce the difference between the products.411
Remark 4ii) shows that the cost of selling high-tier products plays an interesting and412
intuitive role in the retailer’s profits: in addition to cannibalisation of high-tier products413
by low-tier ones, as the cost of selling high-tier products decreases, the competition414
between the two channels intensifies and causes the profitability of both retailers to415
decline. Conversely, the cost of selling high-tier products increases and the retail cost416
disadvantage for the high-end store is too great, which causes the high-end store to417
derive less revenue from high-tier products and results in the retailer’s profitability to418
decrease. Therefore, the difference between the two models in the retailer’s profit is419
highest for a medium sale cost of c∆.420
As Remark 4iii) shows, the difference in profits for the manufacturer and the total421
supply chain reduces between the two models. This can be interpreted as follows: as422
mentioned earlier, an increase in the cost of selling high-tier products can mitigate423
the competition between downstream agents. More specifically, in Model T, high-tier424
products and low-tier products are distributed through two independent retailers who425
do not care about the other’s profitability. However, in Model O, all products are426
distributed by a monopoly retailer who cares greatly about the cannibalisation problem427
between the two products. Thus, as Remark 4iii) indicates, an increased cost of selling428
high-tier products has a greater impact on the profitability of both the manufacturer429
and industry in Model O than in Model T.430
4.4. Numerical analysis431
In our analysis to this stage, we have used the game theoretical method to address432
how differentiated channel policies in marketing affect a manufacturer’s design of product433
lines and the profitability of all parties. To confirm our results, we now undertake an434
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extensive numerical analysis.435
In our both of our models, the manufacturer’s optimal decisions depend on a fun-436
damental question: whether (how) differentiated channel policies affect manufacturers’437
quality differentiation and all parties’ performance. To address the effects of differ-438
entiated channel policies, we will focus our numerical examples on how the nature of439
competition between downstream agents, c, affects the equilibrium of both models.440
Without loss of generality, in all numerical experiments, we would let k = 0.02. Recall441
that, to ensure the comparison of the interior point solutions to both models, we set442
0 < c < min( 1
36k
, 1); that is, in all numerical examples, we restrict that 0 < c < 1. All443
figures are obtained from numerical simulation in Matlab 2014.444
In the first analysis, we confirm that the optimal quality chosen and the difference445
in quality segmentation under the differentiated channel policies are consistent with446

















l . That is, as448
Remark 1 shows, the levels of quality differentiation in Model T decrease compared with449
Model O. On the other hand, Figure 1(a) shows that, for any cost of marketing a high-450
tier product c, uT
∗
h is always lower than u
O∗
h ; this means that the manufacturer always451
downwardly distorts the high-tier products in Model T relative to Model O. However,452





1(a). More specifically, as Remark 2 shows, there exists a threshold, c = 0.81, above454
which the optimal quality of low-tier products in Model T is always lower than that455
in Model O. This means that, when c > 0.81, the manufacturer always downwardly456
distorts the low-tier products in Model T relative to Model O; otherwise, the opposite457
is true. Additionally, based on Figure 1(a), the quality of all products in both models458
decreases with the competition between the downstream agents.459
In the second study, to check on the robustness of Remark 3 on the competition460
between downstream agents, we performed a numerical analysis of the effect of differen-461
tiated channel policies on all parties’ profitability. To avoid unnecessary complication,462
we again assume that k = 0.02 and 0 < c < min( 1
36k
, 1). From Figure 1(b) we conclude463
that, as the selling cost of high-tier products (c) increases, the manufacturer’s profits464
decrease in both models. Furthermore, as Remark 2i) shows, for any selling cost of465
c, the manufacturer’s profit is always higher in Model T than in Model O. We see a466
similar effect: as the selling cost of high-tier products (c) increases, the retailer’s profits467
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in both models decrease (see Figure 1(c)). However, we can observe that, as Remark468
2ii) shows, for any selling cost of c, the retailer’s profit is always lower in Model T than469
in Model O. From Figure 1(d), we find that, for any selling cost of c, the profit of the470
total supply chain is higher in Model T than in Model O. That is, compared to Model471
O, the manufacturer’s profit in Model T is sufficiently large to “compensate” for the472
profit “loss” of the retailer.473
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Figure 1: Effect of differentiated channel policies on equilibrium.
To further explore the implications of differentiated channel policies on the equilib-474
rium in both models, we now demonstrate numerically how our results are affected by475
competition between downstream agents. More specifically, from Figure 2(a), as the476
selling cost, c, decreases (meaning that competition increases), in Model T, the manu-477
facturer tries to increase the difference between the two products. However, in Model478
O, when confronting a monopolist retailer who distributes both products together, as479
the selling cost, c, decreases, the manufacturer is more likely to reduce the difference480
between the products; this is to maximise his own profit and to mitigate the canni-481
17
balisation between both products. Figure 2(b) illustrates that, as Remark 4 ii) and482
iii) shown, the difference in the retailer’s profit between the two models is the highest483
for the medium selling cost of c∆. However, the difference in the profitability for the484
manufacturer and the supply chain between the two models decrease with the cost of c.485
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Figure 2: Effect of c on equilibrium.
5. Model Generalizations7486
In this section, we analyze two relevant extensions and discuss: 1) How does the487
additional horizontal heterogeneous in their search costs, transaction costs, or brand488
loyalty for differentiated channels affect the equilibrium decisions (see §5.1); 2) What is489
the implications of the competition between manufacturers. (see §5.2)490
5.1. Two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity491
In the previous sections, we considered a market where all consumers are only ver-
tically heterogeneous with respect to their willingness to pay for differentiated quality
products. Although this is consistent with previous literature on quality segmentation
(e.g., Desai et al. (2001), Choudhary et al. (2005) and Ha et al. (2016)), in reality, the
manufacturer may adopt differentiated channel policies in terms of market segmentation,
with a correlation between the consumers’ values and search costs. To capture this possi-
bility, we incorporate the additional horizontal heterogeneous behavior in our framework
implies that consumers utility as being two-dimensionally heterogeneous with both the
7We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these two possible model extensions.
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vertical dimension (in their willingness to pay for differentiated quality products) and
horizontal dimension (in their search costs, transaction costs, or brand loyalty for dif-
ferentiated channels). In accordance with previous studies involving two-dimensional
consumer heterogeneity (Desai et al. 2001, Tyagi 2004, Shi et al. 2013), we assume
that consumer utility is defined as U(u, p, θ, t, x) = θu − p − tx, where consumers are
horizontally heterogeneous along transaction costs in x, which follows a general distri-
bution over a [0, 1] line segment representing a linear market (Hotelling 1929). Like
Tyagi (2004) and Shi et al. (2013), we can derive the inverse demand functions for high-
and low-tier products from the consumer utility functions as follows:
ph = uh − uhqh − ulql − tx
pl = ul(1− qh − ql)− t(1− x)
(6)
We can use backward induction to solve both models and obtain the following result.492
Remark 5. If consumers are consumers are two-dimensionally heterogeneous with one493
vertical dimension and one horizontal dimension, then:494
i) The manufacturer is more likely to reduce the product quality distortion in Model T495



















and achieves minimum at x∆;497

































Remark 5 indicates how the transaction costs for different channels impacts on the501
manufacturer’s quality segmentation under differentiated channel policies. It also re-502
veals that Remarks 1-4, which indicate that a range of operational management issues503
arise for manufacturers when all consumers are only vertically heterogeneous on dif-504
ferentiated quality products, can be extended to a market where consumer utility is505
two-dimensionally heterogeneous in the vertical dimension (in their willingness to pay506
for differentiated quality products) and the horizontal dimension (in their search costs,507
transaction costs, or brand loyalty for differentiated channels).508
Next, we go a step further to reveal all possible outcomes in the numerical experi-509








l ) < 0. Thus,510
we can conclude that Remark 1, which indicates that the levels of quality differentia-511
tion decline in Model T relative to Model O, is robust, regardless of whether there is512
a customer search problem and/or transaction costs between different channels. Fur-513
thermore, the difference in the levels of quality differentiation under both models is a514
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concave function for the transaction costs x, and reaches its maximum at x∆. Sec-515
ond, Figure 3(b) shows that the manufacturer’s profit is always higher under Model516







∂x > 0. Third, Figure 3(b) shows that, from the retailer’s perspective,518
selling differentiated quality products through two channels can still lead to a loss in519




r . This is consistent with Remark 3ii). Finally, Figure520
3(b) shows that selling differentiated quality products through two channels can still521




s . This is consistent with522
Remark 3iii).523
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Figure 3: Variations in equilibrium.
5.2. Manufacturer-level competition524
Our analysis until now has assumed that the manufacturer is the monopoly supplier525
in the market. This is inconsistent with the practice where multiple manufacturers526
compete with each other to distribute products through a common retailer in the same527
market. Thus, in this subsection, we consider the scenario in which two manufacturers528
compete with each other for providing differentiated products. Comparing these results529
from those in the preceding section allows us to focus specifically on the implications of530
competition at the manufacturer level.531
Let qi, and Qi, be the units of products made by two manufacturers, where i = h, l532
denotes the type of product (high- or low-quality, respectively) of manufacturer 1 or 2.533
Then, following (McGuire and Staelin 1983, Lal 1990, Desai and Purohit 1999), each534
firm’s demand functions are given by:535
20
Focal Firm:
ph = uh − uh(qh + eQh)− ul(ql + eQl)
pl = ul(1− qh − eQh − ql − eQl)
(7)
Competitor:
Ph = uh − uh(Qh + eqh)− ul(Ql + eql)
Pl = ul(1−Qh − eqh −Ql − eql)
(8)
Where 0 < e < 1 represents the degree of competition between the two manufacturers.536
The higher the value of e, the more intense is the competition between them.537
Solving both competitors’ problems with backward induction, we can obtain several538
interesting characteristics under competition at the manufacturer level.539
Remark 6. If manufacturers compete with each other in a market, then:540



















m , though their profits in both models decrease with the level544




















iv) Iff e < e∆, the profit of the total supply chain in Model T is higher than that in548










By comparing the equilibrium decisions in Model O and Model T, we can obtain550





















m ). That is, the above552
results are valid regardless of whether the manufacturer has monopolistic position or553
not. We further find that, first, compared with Model T, Model O, creating lower prof-554
itability for both manufacturers (see, Figure 4 b), is quite consistent with traditional555
wisdom: As the competition between the manufacturers becomes fiercer, the prices of556
both products decrease; consequently, both manufacturers are more likely to be hurt in557
their profitability. Second, the competition between upstream agents (manufacturers)558
induces the downstream agents (retailers) to restore their monopoly position. Remark559
6iii) confirms this conventional wisdom: as the competition between the manufactur-560
ers increases, the retailers’ profits in both models increase (see, Figure 4 c). Finally,561
the supply chain’ profits in both models would decrease with the competition at the562
manufacturers’ level (see, Figure 4 d).563
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Figure 4: Effect of e on equilibrium.
6. Discussion and managerial implications564
During the past two decades, consumer demands have become more diversified and565
personalized (Ma et al. 2012), to cater to a broader (more heterogeneous) mix of con-566
sumer groups, many manufacturers have responded by offering product lines with dif-567
ferentiated quality. Although, there is a considerable body of research on product lines568
design, most of extent research is focused on quality segmentation from the manufac-569
turing interface and did not include market-related factors, such as the differentiated570
distribution channel policies. Conversely, in spite the fact that many manufacturers,571
including Lenovo, Sony, Procter & Gamble and Buckle, have adopted differentiated572
channel policies through which to market products of different quality, little is known573
about whether (how) differentiated channel policies affect manufacturers’ quality differ-574
entiation and all parties’ performance.575
To gain additional insight into quality segmentation in the impact of market-related576
factors, such as differentiated distribution channels, we develop two channel models for a577
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manufacturer who produces two types of products (high- and low-tier products) together578
but with two options for marketing them: (1) marketing both products through one579
retailer (one-channel policy) or (2) providing high-tier products through one retailer580
but low-tier products through another (two-channel policy). Our main analysis and581
discussion is of interest to product and marketing managers, as quality segmentation582
is characterized by a close relationship with differentiated distribution channels. We583
discuss managerial implications of our key results and make suggestions for further584
research below.585
First, our study suggests that the manufacturer is more likely to decrease the level586
of quality differentiation in Model T than in Model O. That is, our first result points to587
the fact that cannibalization in product lines design is not an “evil” to prevent, but an588
effective strategy that leads financial growth. This is no surprise, on the one hand, as589
previous research has argued that, as the competition among the retailers increases, the590
profitability of the supplier increases. Taking the reasoning one step further, we demon-591
strate that the manufacturer is more likely to increase the substitutability of products,592
which leads a more intense competition between downstream agents. On the other593
hand, although many believe that the cannibalization is detrimental to manufacturer,594
and, thus, should be prevented through a selection with multi-distribution channels,595
our results are in line with the work of Nijssen (1999), who provided empirical support596
for this theoretical result when they conducted a survey of 95 product and marketing597
managers from 21 fast-moving consumer goods companies. In particular, they argued598
that the manufacturer would prefer to line extensions involve cannibalization problems599
due to “cannibalization is very much positive related to a line extension’s success”.600
Second, our analysis reveals that “quality distortion” is not limited to low-tier prod-601
ucts, but can occur with high-tier products, an argument supported by Robertson (1998)602
who showed that, although the taste of consumers have dramatically improved, rather603
releasing those products with radical innovation, many firms are more likely distort604
downward the quality of high-tier products by sharing components in commonality with605
those low-tier ones. For example, Toyota motor offered several model of Lexus (high-tier606
products) based on the same platform and engine as that of the Camry line (low-tier607
ones). Similarly, the premium Honda Acura car is nothing but “Honda Accord: same608
perfume, different bottle” (Desai et al. 2001). Similar case also appears in a variety609
of industries, such as Mobile Phones, Personal Computers, and Electronics and Appli-610
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ances, where high-tier products usually share basic-common with the existing low-tier611
units.612
Finally, it should be noted that, we have shown a conflict internal to the supply chain613
between the upstream agents (i.e., manufacturers) and downstream agents (i.e., retail-614
ers): The two-channel policy benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. During615
the 1980s, in order to generate asymmetric bargaining power, manufacturers used dis-616
tributing quality differentiated products through multi-channels to create an advantage617
of sharing revenue from the sale process (Aaker et al. 1994). However, the situation618
has now changed. In particular, the retailing industry today is increasingly dominated619
by centrally managed “power retailers” who are more sophisticated and manage their620
product categories more efficiently (Raju and Zhang 2005). As a result, how to coor-621
dinate such a channel and help all parties support Model T is particular important for622
product and marketing managers.8623
We acknowledge that our analysis is subject to three limitations. First, we assume624
a monopoly manufacturer who acts as the Stackelberg leader, future research can relax625
such assumptions by highlighting power structure on the retail service. Second, our626
model assumes that both players can make decisions under the condition of complete627
information; in reality, information can be incomplete.9 Third, it can also empirically628
test some of our predictions regarding quality differentiation.629
630
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A. Derivation the inverse demand functions748
We normalized market size to 1. That is, we assume that consumers’ types are749
distributed uniformly in the interval [0, 1] where a consumer of type θ ∈ [0, 1] has a750
willingness-to-pay of uhθ for a high-tier product. Given this assumption, the consumer751
utility function would be Uh = uhθ−ph, where Uh represents the consumer’s utility for a752
high-tier product and ph is the price paid for it. Similarly, the consumer utility function753
for the low-tier product would be Ul = ulθ − pl.754
Since uh > ul, as shown in Figure 5, the utility that each consumer derives from755
purchasing a product is given by the difference of their valuation and the price. From756
these two utility functions, we can find that if Ul = ulθ−pl = 0, a consumer is indifferent757
between buying a low-tier product and not buying. Therefore, the consumers with758
θ > pl/ul would buy the low-tier product. And, when Uh = uhθ − ph = ulθ − pl = Ul, a759
consumer would be indifferent between buying a high-tier product and buying a low-tier760
one. Hence, the consumers with θ > (ph − pl)/(uh − ul) prefer to the high-tier product761
than the low-tier one. Based on the net utilities at two different points, we can derive762
the inverse demand functions in Equation (1).763
B. Proof of Proposition 1764
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l ). By applying FOCs to it with767















l into the manufacturer’s profit (3) and π
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m is jointly concave769






















l into the manufacturer’s profit (3) and we can find that π
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l , (2), (3) and the total profit of the776
supply chain provides the equilibrium outcomes in Model O.777
C. Proof of Proposition 2778



















Figure 5: Consumer state space and corresponding utilities
max
qTh
(uh − uhqh − ulql − wh)qh, max
qTl
(ul(1 − qh − ql) − wl)ql since πTR1, πTR2 is concave780
















l into the manufacturer’s profit (5) and π
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M is jointly concave783


























l into the manufacturer’s profit (5) and solving786






























l , (4), (5), and the total profit of the789
supply chain provides the equilibrium outcomes in Model T.790
D. Proof of remark 1791











































After simplification, this reduces to 0 < c < 2
49k
, for the sales of both products to be796
positive, 0 < c < 1
36k








l is always holds.797






















, that is to say for800











































, the manufacturer would downward distorts the low-tier products in805
Model T; otherwise, the quality distortion of low-tier products would be upward.806
F. Proof of remark 3807



























For the sales of both products to be positive 0 < c < 1
36k





m is always holds.811


























1−20kc−3) for the sales of both products to be positive 0 <814
c < 1
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r is always holds.815




s , we have to show that816  (15817100k
3c3 − 185679k2c2 + 462024kc+ 136323)
√
9 + 92kc

















for the sales of both products to be positive 0 < c < 1
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s is always holds.820
G. Proof of remark 4821































1−20kc−1 . Because, 0 < c <
1
36k









l )]/∂c > 0824












(9 + 92kc)(1− 20kc)− 223074
√





9 + 92kc+ 10783314k2c2
√
9 + 92kc+ 4539564kc
√
(9 + 92kc)(1− 20kc)
−128909140704k5c5 + 2284281248k6c6
√














9 + 92kc− 795511741k4c4
√




















(9 + 92kc)(1− 20kc) + 23458626k2c2
√
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10000k



























































































































Because, 0 < c < 1
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H. Proof of Remark 5836
In Model O, all products are sold through one store, and the retailer therefore chooses837
his optimal outputs of high- and low-tier products (qh, ql) to maximise max
qh,ql
πOr = (ph −838











, respectively. In the last stage, the841
manufacturer’s problem is to design product qualities to maximise the profit in Equation842













In Model T, Retailer One chooses his output of high-tier products (qh) to maximise845
max
qh
πTr1= (ph−wh)qh, while, Retailer Two chooses his output of low-tier products (qr) to846
maximise max
ql




. Substituting these into Equation (5) and solving848






, respectively. The manufac-849



































1− 12k + 18kxB + 6kxA+ 144k2xB + 72k2x2A− 72k2B + 288k2
+12kx− 72k2x2B − 144k2xA− 12kAB +B + AB − 6kA− 18kB







1− 12k + 18kxB + 6kxA+ 144k2xB + 72k2x2A− 72k2B
+288k2 + 12kx− 72k2xB − 144k2xA− 12kBA− 576k2x














10To enable clear analysis of the effect of transaction cost, we assume that the retailer’s unit marketing






5− 216k + 3E + 12kxCDE − 360k2 + 180kx−B + 216k2x2E − 720k2xD
−216k2xC + 360k2x2C + 72kCD + 12kDE − 102kxE + 78kxC + CDE + 2C
+432k2x2D + 5D + 720k2x2 + 72k2x− 30kDB − 12kBE − 24kxB −DEB
−36kxCE + 24kxDE + 2CD + 24kxBE + 42kxBD + 72k2E + 288k2D −BD












 84kx− 5− 12k + 12kxD + 12kxE + 2CDE + 6DE − 12kD +B








1 + 12k − 12kx+ 48k − 84kx,861
B =
√













1 + 12kx+ 48kx− 36k.865
Note that, to ensure all parameters and variables in this subsection must satisfy866
non-negativity constraints, we need 1670k
3−2000k2+1183k+200
1000
≤ c < 47760k3+340k2+418k−15
100000k3
867
The procedure for the proof of Remark 5 is similar to that of Remark 4 in §4.3. Thus868
the details are omitted here.869
H. Proof of Remark 6870
In Model O, all products are sold through one store, and the retailer therefore871
chooses his optimal outputs of high- and low-tier products (qh, ql, Qh, Ql) to maximise872
max
qh,ql,Qh,Ql
πOr = (ph−wh)qh+(pl−wl)ql+(Ph−Wh)Qh+(Pl−Wl)Ql, to establish optimal873
quantities as qh = Qh =
eWl−eWh+ul−wl−uh−ule+uhe+wh
2(ul−ule2+uhe2−uh)




Substituting these into Equation (3) and the similar expression for the competitor. Solv-875
ing the FOCs provides wh = Wh =
uh(uhk−e+1)
2−e and wl = Wl =
ul(ulk−e+1)
2−e , respectively.876
In the last stage, the manufacturer’s problem is to design product qualities to maximise877







In Model T, Retailer One chooses his output of high-tier products (qh and Qh) to879
maximise max
qh,Qh
πTr1= (ph−wh)qh+(Ph−Wh)Qh, while, Retailer Two chooses his output880
of low-tier products (ql and Ql) to maximise max
ql,Ql
πTr2= (pl − wl)ql + (Pl − Wl)Ql, to881








. Substituting these into Equation (5) and the883
similar expression for the competitor. Solving the FOCs provides wh = Wh =
uh(uhk−e+1)
2−e884
and wl = Wl =
ul(1+ulk−e)
2−e , respectively. In the last stage, the manufacturer’s problem is885
to design product qualities to maximise the profit in Equation (3); accordingly, we can886







The details are omitted here and all equilibrium decisions and profits in the following888
Table.889




































































































The procedure for the proof of Remark 6 is similar to that of Remark 4 in §4.3. Thus890
the details are omitted here.891
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